S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 0 9 MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A • 9 LESSONS LEARNED FROM CURTAIN WALL FAILURE INVESTIGATIONS DEREK B. MCCOWAN, PE AND JOSHUA B. KIVELA, PE SIMPSON GUMPERTZ & HEGER, INC. 41 Seyon St., Building 1, Suite 500, Waltham, MA 02453 Phone: 781-907-9000 • Fax: 781-907-9009 • E-mail: dbmccowan@sgh.com and jkivela@sgh.com 1 0 • MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 ABSTRACT This presentation will discuss failures and other problems encountered during forensic investigations of ailing curtain wall systems, with primary focus on glass and metal (aluminum) curtain-wall systems. Failures include air and water leakage, glass breakage, loss of (falling) metal components, fogging glass, and other serious deterioration. The authors will explain the reasons for the failures and explain how to avoid such problems. We will also summarize a few recent successful curtain wall installation projects and some of the key design, preconstruction, and construction procedures that led to the successes and some critical tasks that are often overlooked. SPEAKERS DEREK B. MCCOWAN, PE — SIMPSON GUMPERTZ & HEGER, INC. Derek B. McCowan has eight years of experience in investigation, design and consultation, and construction monitoring and administration of historic and contemporary buildings. He specializes in curtain wall and window systems and also has experience with foundations, opaque wall systems, skylights, and steep- and low-slope roofing. He is currently pursuing a master’s of science in civil engineering/construction management at Northeastern University, and he received a bachelor’s in civil engineering from Union College. McCowan has authored various articles about window and curtain wall systems and has also lectured on these topics. He is a registered professional engineer in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire. JOSHUA B. KIVELA, PE — SIMPSON GUMPERTZ & HEGER, INC. Joshua B. Kivela has more than nine years of experience in design, investigation, evaluation, restoration, and construction administration and monitoring of historic and contemporary buildings. He specializes in waterproofing design of building envelope systems, including foundations; wall systems; curtain walls; windows/glazing; skylights; and flat-, steep-, and low-slope roofing and has a background in construction and laboratory testing. Kivela is an active member on ASTM International Committee D08 — Roofing and Waterproofing. He received his bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from the University of Rhode Island and his master’s in mechanical engineering/materials science from Northeastern University. He is a registered professional engineer in Connecticut as well as a registered professional engineer and civil engineer in Massachusetts. INTRODUCTION Curtain walls are a form of exterior cladding that do not support floor or roof loads—they “hang” off of the building structure like a curtain. Most contemporary exterior wall systems are technically curtain walls, though most people in the architecture/ engineering/design community envision multistory glazed systems when they think of curtain walls. These glazed systems form an integral part of the building enclosure, and they must be designed and constructed to achieve various structural and nonstructural performance requirements, such as the following: • Water penetration resistance, • Air infiltration resistance, • Structural adequacy (transfer all loads back to building structure), • Energy efficiency, • Aesthetics, and • Durability and maintainability. Other design criteria include thermal movement, condensation, sound attenuation, fire resistance, and blast resistance. These performance requirements apply whether the curtain walls are field-constructed (i.e., stick-built), partially prefabricated (i.e., ladder systems), or fully prefabricated in a factory (i.e., modular or unitized systems). The authors have observed various problems with all types of curtain wall systems during the fabrication, installation, and building usage stages. This paper discusses failures and other problems encountered during recent forensic investigations of curtain walls, with primary focus on glass and aluminum systems. Failures include air and water leakage, glass breakage, loss of (falling) metal components, and fogging glass. The reasons for failure and lessons learned are provided to help the reader avoid such problems in their practice. We also discuss some of the more interesting forensic work completed recently by members of national engineering firm Simpson Gumpertz & Heger Inc. (SGH) on problematic curtain wall systems. THE CASE OF THE MISSING SEALANT An owner asked SGH to investigate widespread air and water leakage at his new 14-story office building. The construction of the building exterior had recently been completed, and the office space was approximately 40% occupied. The building includes multistory-height curtain wall “bays” set in large punched openings in exterior walls. Surrounding wall areas consist mainly of brick veneer cavity wall systems. The stick-built curtain wall system was produced by a large, reputable manufacturer. The system includes a combination of pressure glazing (exterior pressure bars at horizontal mullions) and drop-in glazing (fixed exterior bars/stops at vertical mullions) that allow reglazing of vision lites from either the interior or exterior. SGH performed a series of water tests, typically spray rack tests followed by hand nozzle tests for tracing specific leakage paths, followed by disassembly of various wall areas. We discovered a variety of problems, both with the perimeter flashing of the wall and with the curtain wall itself. With regard to the leakage through the field of the wall, the frame seals were systemically deficient (i.e., missing or otherwise discontinuous), which led to widespread leakage throughout the building. The manufacturer’s installation instructions, which were readily available and very clear about the frame-seal requirements, had not been followed. The primary deficiencies of the curtain wall itself existed at the horizontal-to-vertical mullion intersections (i.e., frame corners) and at the splice joints in the vertical mullions (i.e., splices). Frame corners required application of silicone sealant and foam rubber joint plugs (end dams) to fill and seal the joinery. The intent of these materials is to create a watertight pocket so that any water that enters the glazing pocket area exits harmlessly through the weep holes in the exterior pressure bar. SGH found missing and deficient end dams and missing and deficient sealant at the metalto- metal joints at these conditions (Photo 1). Unsealed joinery located at the low point in the glazing pocket allowed water to travel inward to the building interior as easily as it traveled outward through the weep holes. LESSONS LEARNED FROM CURTAIN WALL FAILURE INVESTIGATIONS Photo 1 – Unsealed metal-to-metal joint. S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A • 1 1 Unsealed fastener penetrations at shear blocks at these locations also served as a leakage path. Splices were in similar condition as frame corners: negligible weatherproofing provisions had been provided, with the exception of an occasional piece of department-store-grade silver duct tape. Splice joints required silicone sealant applied to the glazing pocket area that was occasionally exposed to water, though this had not been installed. Therefore, joints acted as open funnels for any water traveling down the vertical glazing pocket. Splice joints were so poorly constructed that daylight was clearly visible from the interior at these areas when interior finishes and spandrel insulation were removed. These various leakage paths also served as avenues for increased air infiltration, though air leakage was a secondary concern for the owner, as the water leakage was causing damage to interior finishes. Corrective action included repairing 100% of the frame seals at the curtain wall. Unfortunately for all parties involved, this required removal of all of the building’s glass units (over 1,500) to expose the frame corners that required the repairs. The entire curtain wall was reglazed. Various other repairs were also performed, including replacement of perimeter membrane flashing, removal of portions of the surrounding cladding systems to allow the perimeter flashing repairs (similar to the work performed below, in the Case of the Projecting Curtain Wall Bays), and roof repairs. Lesson Learned Deficient frame-corner seals can be catastrophic with respect to leakage and are extremely difficult and costly to access for repairs. These recommendations will assist in ensuring that all frame joints are sealed properly during the curtain wall construction/ installation phase. • Obtain the manufacturer’s installation instructions regarding frame seals, and enforce them. Require the installers to follow the instructions to the letter. Focus on horizontal-tovertical mullion intersections, splice joints in vertical mullions, and wallperimeter conditions, as well as other areas noted in the instructions. • Failing to properly install ¼ oz. of silicone sealant can lead to leakage that costs thousands of dollars to access and repair. Take whatever quality-control measures are necessary to ensure proper installation of these seals, such as inspections and performance tests by the manufacturer, design team, consultants, and/or third parties. THE CASE OF PROJECTING CURTAIN WALL BAYS A nine-story, mixed-use building enclosed with projecting curtain wall bays, brick veneer, and Exterior Insulation Finishing System (EIFS) was built in the greater Boston area. Shortly after the building was constructed and before all parties were paid for their work, the owners complained of water leakage at the curtain wall bays, and SGH was asked to investigate the problems. Water testing with and without applied differential air pressure (conducted in accordance with ASTM E1105) and subsequent partial disassembly of the curtain wall showed that the system leaked and did not perform to the specified requirements. Initially, leaks occurred through the curtain wall during water testing at air pressures of 2.1 psf and above. (The curtain wall is rated for 10 psf due to blocked or misplaced weep holes in the pressure bar, missing seals around mullions and joint plugs, and poor drainage (Photo 2) from the over application of sealant.) After the water ran for about 45 minutes to an hour with no applied air-pressure difference, we observed higher volume leaks at the perimeter of the curtain wall. Discussions with the owners and the building maintenance personnel revealed that similar higher-volume leaks had occurred in the past but only during long (about two or more days) rainstorms with and without high winds. We removed the rowlock brick from the base of the curtain wall and observed the membrane sill flashing of the curtain wall turned up against the brick veneer to form an end dam (Photo 3). The through-wall flashing under the curtain wall and the brick wall was made from a combination of sheet metal drip-edge and self-adhering membrane flashing. The upturned rear leg of the membrane flashing was supported by Photo 2 – Water ponding in curtain wall. Photo 3 – Curtain-wall sill flashing not sealed to through-wall flashing. 1 2 • MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 the backup wall at the brick veneer, but it lacked support under the curtain wall; the transverse seams in the membrane through-wall flashing were open, and the flashing sagged under its own weight. The greater problem, however, was that the brick wall and curtain wall flashing did not connect or seal to each other (Photo 3), and the curtain wall lacked jamb flashing altogether. This discontinuity at the throughwall flashing level allowed water to leak into the building from the wall cavity. Our review of the design drawings showed vague details, and the specifications were not explicit on flashing integration. Review of construction photographs and discussions with construction personnel showed that the brick veneer was installed before many of the curtain walls, the self-adhering air-barrier membrane ran long in many areas, and an 8- to 12-in “flap” was visible in the curtain wall rough openings. The construction manager claims he told the curtain wall installer to seal the membrane to the jamb of the curtain wall during installation, but the installer either cut off the membrane or simply folded it into the rough opening. Without a clear design, proper coordination of subcontractors, and a mock-up installation, the installer assumed he did not own the flashing installation. Repairs involved removing the rowlock brick below the curtain walls, “toothing-out” the running-bond brick at the sides of the curtain wall, and installing new continuous through-wall and jamb flashing (Photo 4). Labor costs could have been significantly reduced by saw-cutting a straight vertical joint through the head joints in the brick veneer and reinstalling stacked-bond masonry. The repairs were complicated by the lack of working room created by the inside corners between the brick walls and the curtain wall bays. Lessons Learned Pay special attention when designing and installing projecting curtain wall bays because their shape creates more corners and intersections between adjacent materials and systems than one would see on flush-built curtain walls. Continuity of perimeter flashing is a critical design consideration that is often forgotten. The following are other tips to keep in mind: • Continuous perimeter flashings that connect to adjacent building components should be fully designed and described in the construction documents. Do not rely on the subcontractors to develop such critical details on their own. • Mock-ups of these intersections should be built to vet out potential c o o r dina t i on issues between trades and to confirm trade responsibilities. • Consider the risks of leaving “flaps” of airbarrier membrane in rough openings that will later seal to curtain wall mullions. Flaps of air-barrier membranes are easily damaged if left to hang out of the wall for any length of time. Further, most air-barrier membranes are not designed to span unsupported across gaps and are not designed to accommodate differential movement between backup walls and curtain walls; for these conditions, specialty transition flashing membranes should be considered. • Provide continuous support for membrane through-wall flashings. THE CASE OF THE FALLING TRIM COVERS After maintenance workers began noticing unusual metal components on the ground near a 19-story building in New Jersey, SGH was asked to investigate the cause. Metal trim covers were falling off the building, presenting a danger to people and property below. The curtain wall included various snap-cover sizes and profiles, ranging from 3/8-in, low profile covers to projecting covers more than 2 in deep. SGH performed a 100% survey of the façade, which consists almost exclusively of unitized curtain wall panels. Investigation found a handful of areas where covers were missing, though there were dozens of areas where covers were slightly disengaged. The disengagement was often visible via a small (1/16-in to 1/8-in) joint between the inside edge of the snap cover and the exterior glazing gasket at the pressure bar (Photo 5). This open joint was not present at properly engaged covers. These partially engaged covers were reviewed up close, and the ad-hoc “yank” test was performed. Many covers detached from the wall with little effort (Photo 6). Photo 4 – Continuous copper and membrane sill, through-wall, and jamb flashing. Photo 5 – Space between glazing gasket and trim cover. S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A • 1 3 Some of the disengaging covers did not immediately release due to the presence of a few daubs of silicone sealant that temporarily held the cover in place; though after applying light pressure, the covers readily came loose. During the survey, SGH noted that the corners of the pressure bars below the disengaged covers were usually bent upward, preventing proper snap engagement of the covers (Photo 7). Physical damage, such as dents, scratches, and other evidence of abuse, was also apparent on dozens of covers. We did not conclusively identify the cause of the pressure-bar cover damage, though we suspect that it was due to abuse during erection onto the building. Other theories with merit include poor cutting/ fabrication operations in the factory and bending of covers when they were removed for other reasons, such as to allow reglazing of a cracked glass unit. One additional factor in the falling cover problem included the use of a suspended scaffold (swing-stage) window-washing and maintenance rig that bumped the deeper horizontal covers on its way up and down the building. The house rig included clips designed to engage a vertical rail mounted to occasional vertical curtain wall mullions to help secure the rig to the wall. Unfortunately, the projecting wheels on the rig were not considered in the staging and curtain wall design. As such, the rail system was ultimately abandoned. On a related note, window washers not using a scaffold had been seen standing on the horizontal covers. Perhaps the most disheartening factor for the owner was that the bent pressurebar corners could be fixed quickly and easily by simply bending the bent covers back into place with a pair of common pliers (Photo 8). Unfortunately, this remedy was not implemented during the original construction process (which included an aggressive schedule for curtain wall erection), so a 100% survey and widespread repair campaign were implemented within five years of construction of the building. We added fasteners to all snap covers as part of the repair process, just to provide an additional safety factor and more comfort for the owner. Lesson Learned While the primary function of snap covers is visual (i.e., trim), falling metal is a serious problem that warrants consideration and respect. Do not completely disregard the design of exterior snap covers as one might with interior trim. When using snap covers, keep in mind the following: • Snap engagement alone of unusually deep or otherwise precariously projecting metal components cannot be relied upon for permanent attachment. • Be mindful of haphazard erection techniques and the risk of damage Photo 6 – Trim cover removed from curtain wall by hand with minimal effort. Photo 8 – Fixing pressure bar with pliers. Photo 7 – Bent corner of pressure bar. 1 4 • MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 to weakly secured components. Be particularly careful with unitized wall assemblies due to hoisting/ craning erection techniques. • Consider maintenance and related access needs of the wall systems when designing exterior covers, sunshades, and other projecting elements. THE CASE OF THE WINDOW FILM SGH investigated the cause of insulated glass (IG) units that were breaking at a recently renovated military office building (Photo 9). The window installer removed several IG units and observed that glass-to-metal contact was the cause of some of the breaks, but the installer could not provide an explanation for all the cracks. SGH visited the site and found two crack patterns in the glass. About three quarters of the IG units had cracks that ran perpendicular to the edge and surface of glass (indicative of thermally driven breaks) and about one quarter had cracks that did not run perpendicular to the edge. The IG units had a post-applied tint film on the interior surface (for increased occupant comfort) and vertical blinds in the offices. Cracks were occurring on the south and east elevations only and in IG units with and without post-applied film. Review of the original shop drawings and specifications showed the IG units were to consist of a ¼-in-thick exterior lite, a ½- in-wide air space, and a ¼-in-thick laminated glass inner lite with a 0.030-in-thick interlayer (Figure 1). The glass surfaces on Figure 1 are labeled No. 1 through No. 6. All glass was to be annealed (i.e., not heatstrengthened or tempered). Setting blocks were shown in the sill of the glazing pocket; antiwalk blocks were not shown. Antiwalk blocks are important because they prevent the glass from moving or walking in the frame and thus bearing against hard metal surfaces and/or reducing glazing gasket contact area. The specifications required that the probability of failure of the IG units, upon first application of the design wind load, would not exceed 8 lites per 1,000. (Glass is specified according to probability of breakage because of its susceptibility to the stress-concentrating effects of flaws and the statistical nature of flaw severity and distribution.) The submittals showed that two different tinted films were used. A thermal analysis was performed on the IG units (film included) based on ASTM E2431, Standard Practice for Determining the Resistance of Single-Glazed, Annealed, Architectural Flat Glass to Thermal Loadings. This analysis assesses the probable edge stress in the glass as a result of temperature differential between the central regions of the glass and the concealed edge (Figure 1). Current industry standards for determining thermal-edge stresses in annealed glass apply only to monolithic glass, so other analyses were required to assess the more complex IG unit with applied tint.1 Before using the ASTM method, the solar load for the IG units had to be calculated using a glass/optics computer program. This step took into account the solar transmittance and absorption of the different components (glass, air space, interlayer, Photo 9 – Crack in IG unit. Figure 1 – Thermally driven breaks in IG units. S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A • 1 5 film). Investigators essentially built monolithic glass models with similar optical properties to those of the specified IG units. Investigators calculated the allowable thermal stress for various- sized IG units on the building, based on the permissible breakage rates dictated by the specifications. The predicted inservice thermal stresses were acceptable on the north elevation, but they were excessive on the west, east, and south. Analysis showed that a south-facing unit with an angular shadow pattern would reach the highest stress. The owner replaced the cracked IG units with heatstrengthened glass of the same thickness and size because the analysis showed that this stronger glass could handle the high thermal stresses. They included antiwalk blocks during reglazing to prevent the glass from moving laterally and contacting metal. Lessons Learned For projects requiring use of IG units and an applied film, remember the following: • Consider the requirements for glass film (for occupant comfort, energy efficiency, or blast resistance) during the design-development process and for retrofit projects, and follow industry guidelines for IG unit construction (e.g., the Glass Association of North America) and installation guidelines for applied films (e.g., technical documents by glass manufacturers). • If tinted films, reflective blinds, insulating drapes, or other components that could increase the center- to-edge temperature difference and thermal stress in the glass are used, consider using heat-strengthened glass. The stress analysis to determine the appropriate type of glass should be based on ASTM E2431 and modified as described above or, if a more precise stress assessment is required or complex glass configurations and loadings are encountered, the analysis should be based on finite element modeling. • Review curtain wall shop drawings and require antiwalk blocks at all vertical glass edges. THE CASE OF THE EXPLODING GLASS The authors witnessed this glass breakage firsthand during performance testing of a large mock-up assembly at a testing laboratory (Photo 10). The failure occurred during a 150% ASTM E330 overload test (150% of design wind load for façade) under negative/suction pressure. (It actually occurred during a second, unspecified overload test that the contractor elected to complete; we noted no visible damage during the first overload test.) The curtain wall system that “failed” includes an intermittent aluminum clip that engages a channel at the perimeter of the IG unit. Butt seals are installed at glass joints, similar to those present at common structural silicone-glazing (SSG) curtain wall system joints. Structural silicone adhesive and pressure bars are not present along edges where the clips secure the glass. The custom-designed outside corner condition is “mullionless”; vertical corner framing consists only of a 1.5-in by 1.5-in aluminum tube that is adhered to the glass edges with structural silicone sealant. SGH reviewed the remnants of the glass and glazing materials at the opening of the failed unit (Photo 11). The spacer bar along the noncorner jamb was fully disengaged from the clips, and the spacer bar was bent at various clip locations. We noted damage to the interior pane of glass at more than one clip location, with the most severe damage located approximately 12 inches up from the sill corner. The structural silicone and low-profile aluminum tube at the corner were undamaged. We also reviewed a video of the glass breakage frame by frame after returning to 1 6 • MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 Photo 10 – Glass breakage during mock-up test. Photo 11 – Curtain wall after 150% design load test. the office. Analyses are being performed by the curtain wall manufacturer, insulating glass manufacturer, and the structural engineer who designed the curtain wall framing. These analyses are currently in progress, though it is becoming clear, from the calculations and the video images, that the glass disengaged from the mechanical clips along the jamb prior to fracturing. The analyses show that under the 150% extreme suction load and assuming (1) no deflection of the glass supports (i.e., the mullion and the low-profile tube) and (2) the glass edge is perfectly perpendicular to the clips, approximately 1/8 in of engagement is lost at the clip condition. We are confident that the deflection of the corner tube (visible in the photos) combined with the rotation of the glass edge (and the bending/damage at the spacer bar) result in full loss of engagement/“bite” at the clip conditions (i.e., loss of more than ¼ in of bite). This is supported by the images that appear to show the jamb of the glass unit free of the mullion prior to glass breakage. It appears that the edge of the interior pane of glass contacted (“caught”) the edge of one of the aluminum clips as the glass unit exited the opening, we suspect causing the breakage. When designing the curtain wall system, the structural engineer originally considered only the aluminum framing in his or her analysis; no consideration was given to glass deflection. The insulating glass manufacturer was expected to confirm the strength of the glass units, a common practice. With regard to the corner tube, the structural engineer considered it only as a dead-load support (i.e., as a hanger tube). The structural engineer knew the corner tube was not very stiff and simply assumed the wind load would find its way to the horizontal mullions designed to resist that load. The structural engineer and the glass manufacturer operated independently, allowing this interaction problem to be overlooked. The project team is currently pursuing options for remedying this issue and moving forward with the integrated design and construction phases. Lessons Learned The causes of glass breakage can often be traced to glass-to-metal contact, often due to metal objects being slightly closer to the glass edge than expected. In addition, structural interaction among various elements of a custom system can sometimes lead to unforeseen movements and related problems. Glass is a fragile material, and glazing pockets are tiny spaces; slight deviations in the expected dimensions and deflections can lead to breakage. Careful review and analysis are needed, both for structural performance and for fieldinstalled items that involve metal components in close proximity to the glass. Keep these points in mind for future projects: • Consider all metal objects close to glass, and evaluate the possibility for migration and dimensional variations. Provide cushion for the glass as a rule to allow the glass units to “float” within the opening. • Perform a full structural analysis of all typical and unusual conditions, including consideration of all deflections. Consider the combined effects of deflections of multiple objects simultaneously. Do not analyze framing separately from glass (even if this is convenient contractually) because the two systems do interact. • Consider all tolerances, including combined effects of fabrication, installation, structural, and all other related tolerances. THE CASE OF THE SPOTTED GLASS SGH investigated large failed insulating glass units at a waterfront curtain wall with an unusual and complex geometry. The wall is both sloped (tilted backward/inward) and curved (concave). Building occupants and maintenance staff started noticing visual obstructions within the air space of the glass units, including small brown spots caused by deterioration of the metallic lowemissivity (low-e) coating. The expensive, customized wall system was in place for less than five years before the occupants began complaining about the glass failures. We reviewed the curtain wall system as well as the insulating glass units themselves after deglazing and found various problems that were contributing to the failures (though the primary cause was defective glass units). The curtain wall included weep holes in exterior pressure bars and positive slope toward the weeps to overcome the backward tilt of the wall, though investigation revealed a significant amount of debris in the glazing pocket that absorbed water and slowed drainage. It appeared that most of the debris was built into the wall during the original construction phase (i.e., glazing pockets were not cleaned out prior to installation of glass). Much of the water that entered the glazing pocket drained harmlessly out the weep holes, though some collected in these horizontals due to this debris. This collected water condition increased the relative humidity of the glazing pocket space and may have occasionally caused the insulating glass unit edges to sit in water. Both issues increased the risk of premature glass-seal failure. In addition to the debris issue, the insulating glass hermetic seals were faulty at failed units. We deglazed several units and inspected them up close at a curtain wall subcontractor’s shop. Upon close inspection of the first failed unit, an open “blister” in the silicone secondary seal at one corner was revealed (Photo 12). The blister aligned with an apparently unsealed keyed corner of the spacer bar. It is clear that the blister formed prior to curing of the sealant; the unit may have been placed under pressure prior to curing of the secondary sealant and/or there may have been a mixing or manufacturing problem with the sealant material. Air escaped through a discontinuity in the spacer bar (and primary seal) at the keyed corner and exited through the uncured silicone sealant, which resulted in Photo 12 – Open blister in silicone secondary seal at the corner of an IG unit. S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A • 1 7 the blister. Inspection of other failed units revealed similar blisters. To confirm that the blistered keyed corner conditions were the root of the problem, SGH placed certain failed units in a water bath and applied slight pressure to the units. Air bubbles exited the blistered corners, confirming that there were breaches in the continuity of the hermetic seals (Photo 13). Small amounts of moisture vapor reaching the sealed air space were reacting with the metallic low-e coating in the air space, causing the formation of the brown spots. From a distance, the brown spots had the appearance of condensation. Insulating glass units cannot readily be dried out or otherwise fixed once the hermetic seal is breached and the interstitial space is saturated; therefore, we recommended replacement of all affected units. We also suggest cleaning debris from all glazing pockets to encourage prompt drainage. Lessons Learned Hermetic seal failures may be the result of manufacturing defects or design and construction flaws that unnecessarily expose the seals to water or, more often, a combination of both of these factors. Carefully specify, check, and enforce high-quality hermetic-seal conditions, and design and install draining curtain wall systems that quickly remove water from the glazing pocket. To do so, keep in mind the following: • Specify durable, time-tested, insulating- glass unit spacer and hermetic- seal conditions, such as the following. — Require spacer bars with bent, soldered, or welded corners. Seal or tape spacer-bar joints (do not simply dry-fit joints with a splice key). If keyed corners cannot be avoided, flood these conditions with sealant. — Require continuous primary and secondary seals, giving consideration to joints in spacer bars as potential breaches. — Rigorously inspect insulating glass units that arrive at the site, and reject any units with seal defects. Increase frequency of inspections if even one bad unit is found. Consider visiting the insulating glass-manufacturer’s shop to review operations. For insulating-glass units that are set in unitized frames, visit the assembly plant prior to glazing the frames. • Install curtain wall systems that promptly drain all water to the exterior. — Avoid surface-sealed systems that provide no drainage provisions. Wet seals help minimize water entry into the system but do not rely on them alone to provide waterproofing protection. — Provide weep holes at the low point of flat, horizontal surfaces that may collect water. Slope sill conditions toward weep holes whenever possible for even faster drainage. — Avoid systems that drain down the vertical mullions; instead, drain water directly out weep holes at the sill of every glass lite, as a rule, as water traveling down the verticals may contact the edges of insulating glass units or pond on top of insulating glass units, increasing the risk of premature failure. — Be careful not to obstruct glazing pockets with debris, excess frame sealant, or glazing accessories, as these can slow drainage or even prevent it altogether. CONCLUSIONS Curtain walls can be effective and attractive exterior wall assemblies if proper consideration is given to strong design principles and problems experienced on past projects. Due diligence during the design, preconstruction, testing, and installation phases is warranted to identify and prevent potential problems ranging from the relatively simple (making sure that sealant is installed correctly) to the more complex (finite element modeling of complex glass configurations). REFERENCES American Architectural Manufacturers Association (AAMA), CW-DG-1-96, (Rev. 2005), Curtain Wall Design Guide Manual. Glass Association of North America (GANA), Glazing Manual, 2004 Edition. D.B. McCowan, M.A. Brown, and M.J. Louis, “curtain Wall Cautions; Curtain-Wall Designs; Curtain-Wall Problems,” Glass Magazine, April, May, and June, 2007 (three-part series). Eric Olson, “Avoiding Water Intrusion Problems in Field-Assembled Glazing Systems,” presentation for Windover Construction, January 12, 2010. FOOTNOTE 1. A standard for evaluating thermal stress in IG units is currently under development by ASTM. 1 8 • MC C OWA N A N D K I V E L A S Y M P O S I U M O N B U I L D I N G E N V E L O P E T E C H N O L O G Y • NO V E M B E R 2 0 1 0 Photo 13 – Air bubbling from IG unit.